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Abstract 
The European Constitutional Treaty (ECT) was presented by its drafters as an explicit 
constitution for the European Union (EU 25). We argue that considered as the European 
economic constitution its provisions do not sufficiently allow for the possibility of cooperative 
collective decision (leading to convergence in welfare) in a more than ever numerous and 
heterogeneous EU. Our essential argument in this respect regards the implications of the 
structurally different economic performances and incentives of small and large countries 
under the European economic constitution. Finally, since the present European trade-off 
between “integrity” and “efficiency” appears sub-optimal, we present two original ways of 
achieving potentially better ones in the EU, through a “Great compromise” or “Economic 
constitution(s),” expressing a preference for the latter.  
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“If all nations were small and none were large, humanity would surely be freer and happier. But one 
cannot prevent the existence of great nations.” 
 
                                  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume I, Chapter VIII.1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the context of the growing economic literature on the peculiar brand of federalism the EU 
exemplifies,2 we consider the role of economic and political size in federal regimes, not from the 
external perspective – the question of the size of the EU (what is the critical size for the EU, what 
the EU should do that the member states shouldn’t, etc.., i.e. an absolute approach to size) – , but 
on the internal level, or the question of size within the EU (how does size matters within the EU, 
i.e. a comparative approach of size). We are eventually able to propose some original ways forward 
for the EU out of its current political, economic and social predicament.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: the second section substantiates the question of efficiency and 
sheds some light on a possible “size nexus” in the EU; finally, the third section presents the ideas 
of the “Great compromise” and the “European economic constitution(s)” as ways to improve 
the European integrity-efficiency trade-off, expressing a preference for the latter.  
 
 
2. The dubious efficiency: A “size nexus” in the EU? 
 
 
Searching for consent is costly. How is it possible to minimize the decision-making costs for 
policies that are deemed mutually beneficial, given that decision costs increase with the number 
of parties involved, both because of increased heterogeneity of preferences and because of 
bargaining and other transactions costs? This interrogation led to the original formulation by 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) of what we call the “efficiency” principle. But a reformulation of 
the principle is necessary to shed some light on the EU constitutional political economy.  
 
We define efficiency in the EU as the ability of European economic rules to insure both an 
upward coordination of European economies (high economic growth and full employment) and 
to avoid the choice of harmful non-cooperative strategies (such as “race to the bottom” tax and 
                                                 
1 (New York: Library of America, new translation by Arthur Goldhammer, 2004) 182. We thank Art 
Goldhammer for the references of all Tocqueville quotations in this paper. 
2 See Hix (2005) for a survey. 
social competition). In doing so, we still acknowledge that efficiency cost increase with the 
number of participants that are involved in the process but we add that: i) those costs can be very 
low if constitutional economic rules are efficient enough (the benefit of upward coordination 
balancing the cost of the quest for good rules); ii) they have to take into account heterogeneity 
and especially size heterogeneity of participants in collective action. The simple dynamic of 
“efficiency” is illustrated in Chart I.  
 
[Chart I here] 
 
One should note that this adapted representation allows both for the formal definition of 
efficiency, leading to paralysis when all member states have a voice in the constitutional choice, 
and for the substantial definition, leading to divergence when the rules chosen do not sufficiently 
take into account heterogeneity, not only in preferences, but in characteristics of member states. 
 
What emerges from the abundant economic literature on policy co-ordination is the generic idea 
that the need for co-ordination arises in contexts characterized by interdependencies: in such 
contexts, decentralized decision-making in the absence of co-ordination devices will lead to sub-
optimal, non cooperative, Nash equilibria. In a monetary union with decentralized fiscal 
authorities, economic interdependencies may arise from different channels. They generally result 
from spillovers, i.e. unintended consequences of national macroeconomic policies on other 
member states economies, and such spill-over effects may be positive or negative. 
 
While the economic rationales for policy coordination in a monetary union are quite numerous  – 
but of unequal and debatable empirical relevance – they leave open the issue of how to design 
institutions at the constitutional level that would foster coordination, and also of the costs and 
benefits of the various tools that may be used to elicit favorable behavior from national 
governments of member states in a monetary union (see Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004a). Fiscal 
policy rules, such as the SGP, constitute the minimum coordination devices: by setting limits on 
what national governments are allowed to do, they are meant to prevent them from embarking 
on behavior reputed harmful for the union as whole. But the provisions of the European 
economic constitution, by and large respected, appear insufficient to go further down the path of 
efficiency as we have defined it. Worse, they trigger opposite dynamics. 
  
If European integration is the “invisible hand” described in the Prologue of this paper, then the 
key issue it faces is the economic incentives given to the member States toward reaching mutually 
beneficial equilibrium. In this regard, claiming that the EU has the “right institutions” but the 
“wrong policies” and chastising EU or member States officials accordingly (the naming, blaming, 
shaming approach) has a weak analytical foundation: policies are the outcomes of incentives 
produced by institutions. If policies are systematically wrong, institutions must be flawed.  
 
 
The “European output” 
 
There are two ways of assessing the efficiency of the European economic constitution. The first 
one is to assess the global performance of the EU. Since the euro area is the most integrated part 
of the EU (see Section 4), and thus the one part where the sacrifice of integrity is the most costly, 
one can try to assert its performance, then compare it to the EU (where the sacrifice is less costly, 
see next sub-Section) and to the rest of the world (where no integration of such scope has taken 
place). As it is now well established, the growth performance of the euro area under the 
European economic constitution is nothing less than dismal compared to that of the US and 
Asia, its main economic counterparts (see Chart II). 
 
[Chart II here] 
 
Our estimation of the surprising gap, given the gradual implementation of the European 
economic constitution and economic and monetary integration that resulted from it, is the 
following: during the 1990-2004 period, the growth rate of the euro area was approximately half 
of that of the US and a quarter of that of Asia. The result of this sustained dismal growth is 
respectively a 16 percent and 49 percent gap in terms of output at the end of the period regarding 
its two counterparts in globalization. The concern over this “growth gap” that strikingly seems to 
widen as the economic integration progresses, is reinforced by the decreases in standard of living 
and productivity from 1996 to 2003 (our period of reference, see infra Box I). In the meantime, 
unemployment maintained itself between 9 percent and 11 percent, barely decreasing in the late 
1990s only to increase again in the early 2000s onward. Whatever the explanation, this 
performance has to be related to the considerable effort implied by European integration.   
 
The second way to assess the efficiency of the European economic constitution is to measure the 
degree of coordination between European economies that the application of European 
constitutional provisions has allowed. The overall performance might not be that good, but this 
could be explained by numerous factors (among them the much-maligned “social models,” see 
following Sections), although, once again, the non-application of the European economic 
constitution could not be said to be one of them. A convergence among member states in 
nominal (the “Maastricht convergence” and EMU management) and structural terms (the 
“Lisbon strategy”) would be the sign of the partial success of the EMU rules and the promise of 
a better growth and development performance for the future. Alas, this picture is also 
surprisingly disappointing (see Chart III).  
 
 
[Chart III here] 
 
Our estimation leads to the conclusion that nominal and real divergence in the euro area is 
roughly the same in 2003 as it was in 1996. Standard deviation in inflation rates has decreased 
from 0.98 to 0.95 while standard deviation in productivity levels has decreased from 18.2 to 17.9, 
the same negligible 0.03 convergence.  
 
This general picture of the “European output” is of great importance for the relevance of the 
input-output trade-off. Two specific conclusions can also be drawn from it. The first one is that 
in spite of efforts during the transition phase to economic and monetary union, especially 
through the imposition of convergence criteria toward the Euro for almost a decade (1992-1999), 
the economies of the euro area have proven much more heterogeneous than what had been 
expected and, in a way, resistant to the convergence process chosen and implemented. This 
resistance has to be explained. Second, this resistance to convergence has very important 
consequences in terms of macroeconomic management, both with regard monetary and fiscal 
policies. While “social models” on the one hand, and monetary conditions and transmission 
mechanisms on the other have been pushed forward in the recent literature as candidates able to 
account for such differences, we offer another explanation, that we test, based on the 
heterogeneous size of European countries.   
 
Our main argument can be summed up as follows: one of the major reasons why European 
economic constitution provisions have become increasingly inefficient is that they do not take 
into account a structural heterogeneity among member states, namely their sizes. To put it simply, 
European constitutional provisions are “size-blind” while size matters and therefore are 
systematically biased which is the worse a constitutional provision can be. The consequence of 
this bias is far-reaching: heterogeneity in size in a monetary union means heterogeneity in 
structures, performances and incentives, eventually resulting in conflicting strategies that can 
become inefficient for all parties.  
 
The “size nexus” 
 
The theory of collective action3 has first identified a size issue in political economy dynamics. But 
our “size nexus” argument goes back to the very beginning of the modern understanding of the 
dynamic of international trade. It was John Stuart Mill, after the classical contributions of Adam 
Smith, his own father James Mill and David Ricardo, who first made the case for the role of size 
in trade and economic performance.  
As it is well known, the point of departure of Mill is the idea that if trade is mutually beneficial, it 
is not equally beneficial to participants. As Mill (1844) puts it in “Of the Laws of Interchange 
between Nations; and the Distribution of the Gains of Commerce among the Countries of the 
Commercial World:” “it is the purpose of the present essay to inquire, in what proportion the 
increase of produce, arising from the saving of labor, is divided between the two countries,” what 
he calls “the question of exchangeable value.”  In doing so, he goes on, “we must revert to a 
principle anterior to that of cost of production, and from which this last flows as a consequence,-
namely, the principle of demand and supply.” In other words, while Ricardo’s comparative 
advantages, whatever their origin, determines pre-trade relative prices, Mill intend on explaining 
post-trade prices, that determine which country, or type of country, gain the most from trade, 
given that all countries’ gains are assumed to be positive when compared to autarchy.  
His theory, re-asserted in Mill (1848)4 and later called “reciprocal demand,” is formulated by him 
as follows:  
 
It may be considered, therefore, as established, that when two countries trade together in 
two commodities, the exchangeable value of these commodities relatively to each other 
will adjust itself to the inclinations and circumstances of the consumers on both sides, in 
                                                 
3 See Olson (1965). 
4 “Of International values”, chapter XVIII, book III. 
such manner that the quantities required by each country, of the article which it imports 
from its neighbour, shall be exactly sufficient to pay for one another. 
 
The subtle and profound conclusion of Mill, directly leading to the idea of a structural advantage 
of small countries over large one in international trade is further explained in those terms:   
 
If the question be now asked, which of the countries of the world gains most by foreign 
commerce, the following will be the answer. If by gain be meant advantage, in the most 
enlarged sense, that country will generally gain the most, which stands most in need of 
foreign commodities. But if by gain be meant saving of labour and capital in obtaining the 
commodities which the country desires to have, whatever they may be; the country will 
gain, not in proportion to its own need of foreign articles, but to the need which 
foreigners have of the articles which itself produces. 
 
Translated in modern economic parlance, this intuition means that the gain from international 
trade of a given country will be determined by the relative strength of the demand for its exports 
compared to its demand for imports. More precisely, the gain from trade between two nations 
will be distributed equally only if their terms of trade (the value of their exports in term of their 
imports) are equal. When the two nations are unequal in size (i.e. economic size, cf. infra), Mill 
thus showed that the small country could reap the benefit of trade since its needs in terms of 
internal demand could be satisfied by (labor saving) trade while its exports could be amply 
demanded to fulfill the consumption needs of the large country, unable to fully satisfy its internal 
demand.  
 
On the contrary, the large country would only benefit in a limited way (the limit being the 
capacity of production of the small country) of trade, responding to its unanswered internal 
needs by a forced “production of commodities by more costly processes at home” and thus 
losing the corresponding specializing gains. In sum, while trade between two nations of equal size 
can produce terms of trade halfway to the pre-trade prices of each nation, and thus equal gains 
resulting from post-trade prices, trade between a small and a large nation is likely to produce an 
unequal outcome in the favor of the small nation, the post-trade prices being too close from the 
large nation pre-trade prices. How to make sense of Mill’s argument in the euro area context 
without stretching it too far?  
 
We have shown elsewhere (in Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2006) that the European economic 
constitution can broadly be characterized by four essential provisions, themselves resulting in two 
main features: a well-institutionalized Single market allowing for a strong (free) trade integration 
and a strong constrain put on macroeconomic instruments, reducing the ability to implement 
stabilization policies. In this context, it is our belief that economic performances will 
systematically differ between small and large countries, which may account for a substantial part 
of the inefficient divergence observed supra.  
 
To test our analysis and prove our point, we devise a very simple theoretical framework and 
empirical strategy. We first have to define what we mean by small and large European countries.  
The literature trying to stress the importance of size, in particular the one that focused on “small 
states,” while at least two decades old in its modern version (see Katzenstein, 1985), has recently 
gained momentum and is now in a state of fast-development in relation with European 
integration (see Archer and Nugent, 2002).   
 
A crucial point of this literature with which we find ourselves in complete agreement is to show 
that while there is no consensual definition of size, it is because this notion is essentially relative 
in international relations. Depending on the context in which small states find themselves, their 
“smallness” can translate into very different power position. It is obvious that given the “over-
representation” of small states in the EU, their power is considerably higher than equally small 
states not implied in such an a-typical regional organization.5 
 
We make ours such a comparative definition of size: in the remainder of the paper, a “small” 
state, whatever the criterion used, is defined as one with a quantitative characteristic inferior to 
the fourth of that of the biggest or largest state. A “medium” state is defined as one with half (of 
the biggest state). “Large” states are those remaining. We then introduce two different definitions 
of size: demographic size (Table I) and economic size (Table II).  
 
 
[Tables I & II here] 
 
As shown in Tables I and II, in terms of demographic size, the EU as a whole can be said to be 
composed of 19 small states, 2 medium states and 4 large states. In economic terms, the count is 
                                                 
5 We come back to this important point in Section 3.  
almost identical, the EU being composed of 20 small states, 1 medium state and 4 large states 
(Poland logically being the “swing” state). Our definition is even more symmetrical for the euro 
area, which can be said to be composed, both in terms of population (demographic size) and 
GDP (economic size), of 8 small states (hereafter “the small 8”), 1 medium state (Spain) and 
three large states (hereafter “the big 3”). Equipped with this definition of size, we now turn to 
our theoretical framework. Using Mill’s intuition, we build our model with the first block being 
demographic size (see Chart IV). 
 
[Chart IV here] 
 
The theoretical part of the Chart is straightforward. While demographic size (defined as the 
population level) logically determines economic size (defined as the GDP level), economic size 
determines whether a country will be open to trade (openness being measured by trade to GDP 
ratio), the traditional “small open economy” or, on the contrary dependent on its domestic 
market to grow (“the big closed economy”).  This theory is then applied to the euro area and the 
reference to Mill follows: we wonder in what direction economic size determines the growth 
performance. Growth performance in turn determines inflation and public finance performance. 
It also determines unemployment on the one hand, and the ability/gain from implementing 
structural policies (or, conversely, the need for macroeconomic stabilization policies). This 
sequence finally determines the policy implication of our model: the relevance (or irrelevance) of 
the size-blind European economic constitution. Eventually, if our empirical analysis confirms our 
theoretical intuition, a reform in the European economic constitution as well as in the growth 
strategy pursued in the EU (the “Lisbon agenda”) would be needed. 6  
 
The very simple empirical strategy we have chosen to test this set of hypotheses is explained in 
detail in Box I, as well as our main results and their implications.  
 
[Box I here] 
 
 
The results are presented graphically and numerically in Chart V to VII. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The signs and numbers shown on Chart IV result form our empirical analysis (see Box I). 
[Charts V to VII here] 
 
In a nutshell, our conclusion is that “size matters” for growth and macro-management in the 
euro area in a similar geographic way that “borders matter” for trade. Theories of trade, however 
sophisticated, have to take into account the basic geographical determinant consisting of physical 
proximity. In the same way, macroeconomic management depends fundamentally on country 
size. Actually, in the EU case, size matters even more than borders matter; since the fact that 
European countries are geographically close explains a good deal of trade intensity which in turn 
determines size-related economic performance divergence. Focusing on monetary policy, we 
offer an empirical example of the consequences of the “size nexus” in Chart VIII, giving 
evidence of a “size penalty” in the euro area (the bigger the country, the lower the inflation rate, 
the higher the real interest rate).  
 
[Chart VIII here] 
 
In qualitative terms, we believe we have gathered evidence of the existence of a “Millian growth” 
(see Box I), systematically biased under the European economic constitution in favor of small 
states of the euro area.  In quantitative terms, we present evidence of a systematic divergence between 
small states and large states that amount to 2.3 percentage points in real growth, 0.73 percentage 
point in inflation and 3.12 percentage points in public finance balance (see Charts V to VII).  
 
Our results, in addition to the evaluations presented in Box I (see next sub-section), are also to be 
confronted with the historical and geographical perspectives. This is done respectively in Tables 
III-A & III-B and in Table IV. 
 
[Tables III-A, III-B here] 
 
Table III-A shows that a certain convergence has taken place among EU 12 countries in terms of 
productivity. But the persisting differences can be attributed to the differences between small and 
large countries. It also confirms the idea that the gap in standard of living between the euro area 
and the US between 1975 and 1990 can not be attributed to a gap in productivity, but that this 
catch-up seems now over, the productivity gap beginning to increase again between 1990 and 
1998. Table III-B rules out the hypothesis of growth performances explained by a Solow type 
convergence (less capital per capita leading to higher productivity and higher growth) between 
small and large countries in the euro area. The convergence is already achieved by 1990. What is 
spectacular on the contrary, and the symptom of the “Millian growth” under the European 
economic constitution (see Box I), is the inversion of GDP per capita difference between small 
and large countries in the future euro area between 1990 and 1998. The increasing gap in terms 
of GDP per capita between 1990 and 1998 relative to the US accounts for the well-documented 
difference between the American “glorious decade” and the European dismal one.   
 
Table IV, beside our basic argument that EU 12 member states diverge according to size, shows 
that our results are consistent, from a geographical perspective, on two different levels.  
 
 
[Table IV here] 
 
During our period of reference, the small country under the economic provisions of the EU  but 
not in the euro area (Sweden) does less well than small countries in the euro area (but better than 
large countries), while both are outperformed by countries outside the EU. The economic effects 
of the European economic constitution seems thus to follow a “U” curve for small countries, in 
relation to the degree of openness to trade that the Single market on the one hand and 
globalization on the other offer and to the macroeconomic stability provided by the monetary 
union.  Symmetrically, the large country outside the euro area but in the EU (the UK) does better 
than large euro area countries, while large countries outside the EU do better than both. This 
time, the degree of macroeconomic autonomy seems to be the driving factor behind those 
differences in performance.  
 
Our main finding is that small countries have substantially outperformed large ones in the euro 
area because they are more open to trade. The two groups thus exhibit systematic 
macroeconomic divergence in terms of inflation and public finances inconsistent with the present 
state of the European economic constitution as well as with the growth strategy entailed in the 
Lisbon agenda (Chart IV). This result is in line with some of the recent literature relating 
economic performance to size.  
 
On the one hand, Alesina and Spolaore (2005) show that country size matters for economic 
prosperity insofar as it is correlated with the country’s degree of economic integration with the 
rest of the world. More precisely, the fact that small countries have prospered more than large 
ones in the EU seems related to the fact that the benefits of country size decrease as economic 
integration increases, or that benefits of trade openness and economic integration become larger 
for smaller countries. The fact that the European economic constitution gives small countries the 
advantage of trade while not allowing large countries to compensate their handicap may therefore 
explain part of the divergence in their performances in the recent period.  
 
On the other hand, the theoretical idea according to which small size favors the implementation 
of structural reforms while large countries are in need of macroeconomic stabilization (argument 
elaborated in detail in Le Cacheux 2005) has recently received empirical validation. Duval and 
Elmeskov (2005), who perform regressions for 21 European countries in the period 1983-2003, 
find for instance that the incentive to implement structural reform is strengthened for small 
countries, because “the up-front costs of structural reform may rise more as a result of moving to 
EMU in large, relative closed economies than in smaller, more open economies.” “Simulations 
using OECD’s macroeconomic model, Interlink, supports these conjectures” they add, arguing 
that “In the more open (Dutch) economy, improved competitiveness leads to market share gains 
that fairly quickly translate into a fall in unemployment …In the more closed (French) economy 
the process is much slower.”  
 
Furthermore, they note that: “The results concerning the influence of monetary autonomy and 
country size can be rationalized within a framework where structural reform is expected to create 
slack resources in economies. In small open economies such slack is more quickly taken up 
through changes in net trade and incentives to undertake structural reform are therefore stronger. 
In larger, more closed economies, by contrast, net trade is less powerful as a mechanism for 
taking up slack. Hence, such economies are more reliant on accommodation through monetary 
policy when they undertake structural reform, and when exchange-rate arrangements exclude 
such accommodation they undertake less reform.” This line of reasoning is consistent with our 
finding that the monetary “size penalty” endured by large countries in the most recent period (see 
Chart VIII) is likely to slow even more their implementation of structural reforms.  
 
In the light of this section, the present design of the European economic constitution which does 
not discriminates countries on the criterion of size, appears to be systematically biased against 
large countries. It thus might be ill-suited to promote high levels of growth, employment and 
convergence among member states belonging to the EMU. Moreover, the present constitutional 
economic provisions are likely to increase the risk that non-cooperative strategies will be chosen 
in the EU. Before coming to this point, we first have to show that our “size nexus” argument 
holds despite the widely held belief that European economic shortcomings are first and foremost 
the result of a “social nexus.”  
 
The size nexus vs. the “social nexus” 
 
Since the publication of the seminal work by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and the 1995 
OECD Job study, the debate over European economic performances has been dominated by the 
idea that labor market quality (itself determined by the “flexibility” allowed by low levels of 
taxation and redistribution, i.e. a small “socio-tax wedge”) fundamentally determines growth in 
Europe. While this partial equilibrium analysis is nothing new7 and empirically doubtful (see 
Fitoussi and Passet, 2000, Fitoussi, 2002b, and Le Cacheux and Sterdyniak, 2003), the argument 
seems to exhibit an hysteresis of its own, at it is perpetually re-asserted as the starting point for 
diagnosing Europe’s growth problem.   
 
In Tables V-A to V-F and Charts IX and X, equipped with the framework of the “size nexus,” 
we offer new evidence that its foundations seem weak.   
 
[Tables V-A to V-F here] 
 
While the coefficients for the “size nexus” presented in Tables V-B, V-E & V-F remain strong 
and significant against the “social nexus,” social transfers seem to contribute positively to growth. 
An analysis based on the relation between growth and social transfers and total expenditures 
must nevertheless consider the possibility of strong reverse causation, i.e. counter-cyclical 
behavior of those expenditures (due to “automatic stabilizers”), such that as growth increases, 
expenditures and transfers should fall. When social transfers enter significantly in the regression, 
however, the surprising result is that they are positively related to growth.  
 
Here a reference can be made to the literature relating openness to the size of the government. 
Rodrik (1998) has argued that small open economies compensate the risk of openness to trade by 
large social transfers. Our results, as limited as they are by the very simple methods we have 
chosen, confirm this view in showing that social transfers are positively related to openness. 
                                                 
7 The founding contribution of Jacques Rueff identifying unemployment insurance as the major cause of 
persistent unemployment was published in 1931. 
Furthermore, they indicate that while small open economies need a strong welfare state to 
compensate the hazards of openness, large closed economies need autonomous macroeconomic 
policies to compensate their lack of openness and make the most of their domestic market in 
order to grow.  
 
In any event, unemployment and long-term unemployment, do not seem related to either of 
these variables, while they are strongly related to size. We find that the gap between small and 
large countries in terms of unemployment and long-term unemployment is respectively of 3.9 
and 2.2 percentage points. The “size nexus,” both for growth and unemployment, seems stronger 
than the “social nexus” in the EU 12. Chart IX & X graphically confirm this result.  
 
 
[Charts IX & X here] 
 
While Chart X shows that the relation between size and unemployment seems strong, Chart IX 
gives some evidence of the weakness of the “social nexus.” Two versions of the “social nexus” 
are confronted with reality with no success, the intra-model differences in unemployment being 
much more significant than inter-model differences, suggesting that another factor drives the 
divergence among EU 12 member states, namely size. 
 
A final way to measure the apparent irrelevance of the “social nexus” is to pair EU 15 countries 
two by two, one small and one large, in the same social model category (the “nordic model” has 
only one small representative). This is done in Chart XI which once more seems to confirm that 
size trumps social in the euro area. 
 
[Chart XI here] 
  
 
As already observed in Table V, the performances of the UK among the big countries of the EU 
15 are unambiguously the best. One has to keep in mind in this regard that the UK does not 
belong to the euro area and that, as such, its economic system is ruled by another economic 
constitution, namely a “golden rule” for public finances (while government consumption has to 
be balanced, pubic investment can be in deficit) and a subtle constrained discretion model for its 
central bank, independent in terms of means (“instrument independence”) but not in terms of 
objectives and accountable to public authorities (“goal independence”). 
 
Having presented what we believe to be convincing empirical evidence of the existence of the 
“size nexus” in the euro area, we now turn to its consequences for the stability of the European 
monetary union under the current economic constitutional regime.  
 
 
The ox, the frog and the road to tax and social competition  
 
In his famous fable, “The Frog who Aspired to Become as Big as the Ox,” La Fontaine warned 
courtesans of the vital danger of trying to become, blinded by ambition, what they were not. We 
would like in this sub-Section to articulate the same warning in the EU case, although in the 
opposite direction. The EU is essentially a big closed economy. Its degree of openness is close to 
that of the largest of its members. Following our argument, it means that it should allow for 
macroeconomic policies in order to make the most of its domestic market. Otherwise, in 
pretending to be a frog while it is an ox, or in applying economic rules made for small economies 
while it is a large economy, it takes the risk of structurally jeopardizing its growth. “Millian 
growth” is not suited for the euro area in the long-run.  
 
This is not to say that “Millian growth” has not produced some success. The case of Ireland 
presented in Chart XII is nothing less than spectacular. 
 
[Chart XII here] 
 
The country is EU’ s greatest economic success and best argument for (small) new comers: the 
country was among the poorest among Western nations before joining the EU (and then the 
euro area) and is now only second to Luxembourg in terms of GDP per capita. There is no doubt 
that it was its integration into the Single market that explains its economic success, while its 
openness is the major feature of its economic structure. The economic constitutional provisions 
of the EU, the free trade and macroeconomic constraints they entail, fit (and actually shaped) 
Ireland’s economic strategy perfectly well. The downside is that Ireland accounts for less than 2 
percent of EU 12 total GDP, which is ultimately the Single market on which Ireland itself 
depends, along with all the other small states of the EU. Chart XIII shows how GDP is 
distributed in the euro area. The three largest countries represent 71 percent of the total. The 
reason why the European economic constitution appears inefficient is thus straightforward in our 
view: it is ill-suited for 71 percent of the economic area it rules.  
 
[Chart XIII here] 
 
The paradox and the peril of the situation is that large countries are domestic-driven economies, 
as shown in Chart XIII, which small countries depend on, as shown on Table VI (while the 
opposite is not true), but that the European economic constitution is made of rules for small 
open economies. 
 
[Table VI here] 
 
Another way of looking at the problem is to say that a small country does not need 
macroeconomic stabilization instruments the way a large one does.8 The tools available to adjust 
to a negative macroeconomic shock (recession and rise of unemployment) are not of the same 
essence, and thus of the same effects, than for a large one. Because its economy is largely open, 
regarding goods and services as well as foreign direct investments and other capital flows, a fiscal 
policy will have little effect on domestic demand for a small economy, since most of its impact 
will be absorbed through imports. 
 
Hence, for a small open economy, traditional fiscal policy of the Keynesian kind will usually be of 
little efficiency, whereas all policies that improve the competitiveness of the national economy by 
lowering production costs of firms located in the domestic economy are relatively more powerful: 
this may explain why fiscal consolidations in small countries have been found to have “non-
Keynesian” effects in the EU; it also suggests that tax competition, “structural reforms” and wage 
moderation policies will all have very powerful, positive effects for a small open economy, both 
because domestic demand represent a fraction of demand to domestic firms and because the 
elasticity of the supply of external capital –  in particular foreign direct investments – is higher, 
the smaller and the more open the economy is. In addition, policies that lower production costs 
in a small economy do not harm domestic demand very much, and they have little incidence on 
domestic inflation, so that they do not raise real interest rates, as nominal rates in a monetary 
                                                 
8 See Le Cacheux (2005b). 
union tend to be uniform across countries and to be relatively less influenced by the policies of a 
single, small country. 
 
For large countries on the contrary, free riding is impossible and the various policies reviewed 
above tend to be more costly, or even counterproductive for the economic system. Keynesian-
style demand-management policies, especially fiscal policies, are more efficient for large relatively 
closed economies than for small open economies. On the other hand, all policies tending to 
lower production costs are less effective, and they all tend to lead to a lower domestic inflation, 
which then results in a higher real interest rate, so that they tend to be costly in terms of 
economic activity and growth.  
 
The fate of Germany over the past few years seems to be a perfect illustration of this difficulty of 
large countries in an economic and monetary union regulated by the rules of the kind of 
European economic constitution. The “frog strategy” adopted by the largest Euro area country 
(see Chart XIV) consists in lowering its labor costs to gain export competitiveness. But its growth 
crucially depends on domestic demand. Hence Germany, against its economic nature, behaves like 
a small country.  
 
[Chart XIV here] 
 
The incentive system devised by the European economic constitution is thus likely to damage 
growth performance in the EU even further. Small countries could be tempted, like Ireland, to 
engage in tax and fiscal competition, hoping that retaliation from the large countries will not 
come. Large countries, behaving like small countries and thus trying to compete using “social 
disinflation” rather than exchange-rate policy, would adopt competitiveness policies focused on 
labor cost reduction and welfare state roll-back policies. Since they are not small, they will trigger 
strategic reaction from other large countries, who in turn will engage in the race to the bottom.  
Some elements of this worst-case scenario have already appeared (see Laurent, 2006). 
 
It should be noted here that social-tax competition acts as a “shadow constitution” for 
redistribution policies in the EU, as noted by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). It constitutes a set 
of invisible but effective rules imposed on social policies.9 It should also be stated that, if this 
dynamic could be further influenced by the Eastern enlargement, it does not at all seem to result 
                                                 
9 See Laurent (2006). 
from it, but from the economic constitutional regime chosen by Western member states of the 
EU 25 when they were the EU 15. 
 
This system, if not reformed, could eventually lead to the transformation of the EU 12 into a low 
growth non-cooperative area10 whose existence could quickly become uncertain, the fate of the 
small countries not being any better than that of the large.11 
 
In the face of the evidence presented in this and the previous section, it is quite hard to believe 
that the EU has reached a “stable and attractive” “constitutional compromise” that it would be 
irresponsible to “upset” (Moravcsik, 2005b). On the contrary, one is inclined to search for 
solutions to the present and mostly future instability of the European polity induced by the unfair 
and inefficient European economic constitution. We finally turn to two possible ways of re-
contracting the European economic constitution.  
 
3. Economic democracy and federalism: The “Great compromise” vs. the 
“European economic constitution(s)” 
 
 
In the previous Sections of this paper, we have attempted to show that the trade-off between 
integrity and efficiency in the EU was sub-optimal: while integrity costs seem very high, efficiency 
benefits seem very low. In our view, the serious crisis in which the EU is engaged since May 2005 
has no other fundamental explanation. We believe, like Paul Romer, that “a crisis is a terrible 
thing to waste.” We thus finally offer in this section two original ways out of the current 
European predicament, taking into account the necessity of reconciling unity in the EU with 
diversities in both social model and size.  
 
We first try to formalize a starting point for policy, in the framework of the integrity-efficiency 
trade-off. The EU is confronted with four possibilities in the space defined by the integrity-
efficiency trade-off (see Chart XV).  
 
 
[Chart XV here] 
                                                 
10 The scenario of a competitive Europe was first presented by Fitoussi (1999). See also Le Cacheux and 
Saint-Etienne (2005) and Laurent (2005b). 
11 Fontagné (2004) shows how the “Luxembourg model” has developed a fatigue of its own.  
 
 The first one is the status quo, which, given our arguments in Section 6, isn’t really a possibility. 
An un-reformed European economic constitution would plunge the EU into tax and social 
competition and eventually result in des-integration (less integrity; less efficiency). Another choice 
would be to regain some integrity (i.e. national sovereignty) but, if un-coordinated, this risks 
jeopardizing the global efficiency of the EU (and euro area) and finally not be very different from 
the pseudo-status quo of tax and social competition (less efficiency; more integrity).  
 
The two remaining choices imply political re-contracting, i.e. the drafting of a new European 
economic constitution. The first method on this path consists of acknowledging the discrepancy 
between the “size nexus” and the size-blind economic rules of the European economic 
constitution and the role it plays in diminishing the efficiency of the EU. It implies discriminating 
among European countries on the basis of size, and thus sacrificing some integrity (understood 
here as equality between member states with respect to the choice of economic constitutional 
provisions) to gain some efficiency. We call this solution the “Great (European) compromise” 
(less integrity; more efficiency, cf. infra).  
 
The last solution is our preferred solution since it would allow progress both in terms of integrity 
and efficiency. It would consist of giving a full autonomy to the euro area inside the EU 25, 
thereby distinguishing between the EU 25 and the EU 12 in terms of choice of constitutional 
economic provisions. Furthermore, this solution implies what we call a “small compromise” 
among EU 12 member states, recognizing the importance of the “size nexus” (which explains 
why, graphically, the frontier between “Great compromise” and “European economic 
constitutions” is porous). The reason why this last solution would be able to improve both 
integrity and efficiency, is that it is likely to minimize both integrity and efficiency costs, or, to say 
it differently, to expand the trade-off frontier between efficiency and integrity.  
 
Before developing these two ways out of the current European crisis in detail, we first have to 
characterize empirically the context in which they could be undertaken. That is, the spectacular 
rise of the number of small states in the EU, changing the democratic balance between economic 
and political power both in the EU 25 and EU 12. In other words, the “size nexus” to be taken 
into account in economic policies, has first to be taken into account in terms of policy-making.  
 
 
 The rise of the smalls in the EU 
 
To fully understand why size matters and is likely to matter even more in the future, one should 
actually keep in mind the spectacular contemporary evolution of the number of small and large 
countries in the EU (see Chart XVI). 
 
[Chart XVI here] 
 
Started in the 1950s with only six countries, three of which were “large” and three “small,” the 
European integration process has progressively included more and more countries but mostly  
“small” states, that have come to represent 50 percent, 60 percent, 66 percent and finally 76 
percent of the total. Chart XIV shows that the tipping point of the contemporary European 
Union (and of the future euro area) in this respect seems to be 1995, when Finland, Austria and 
Sweden joined the EU (Finland and Austria later joining the euro area). As shown in Table II & 
III, the EU and the euro area respectively encompass now, at the end of this evolution, 19 and 8 
small states, 2 and 1 medium state and 4 and 3 large states.  
 
As noted in Alesina and Spolaore (2003), the emergence since 1945 of a large number of 
economically highly integrated and “small” countries is a global, and not only European,  
phenomenon, corresponding to a simultaneous “economic integration” and “political 
disintegration”. The specificity of the EU “small” states however is that, being the product of the 
two former evolutions, they have then been able to re-integrate themselves in the framework of a 
political regime where they have acquired a power unrelated to their demographic and economic 
size. The idea of the “Great compromise” would be precisely to re-balance the EU in favor of 
the large states, in the name of “efficiency.”  
 
 
A “great (European) compromise”  
 
“The federal system was created in order to combine the various advantages of largeness with 
those of smallness”12 argues Tocqueville in the Chapter VIII, Volume I of his Democracy in 
America. If that is so, given the degree of economic integration achieved in the EU, an agreement 
between small and large countries should be possible for the sake of mutual benefit.  
 
But first, one should take the measure of the problem at stake, namely the imbalance of power 
between small and large states in the EU, or more precisely, between economic size and political 
size in the EU. While small European states are “magnified” by the EU decision-making system 
in the EU 12 and the EU 25, large European states appear to be “shrunk” when their economic 
and political size is compared in the euro area and in the EU (see Table VII for the EU 12 and 
Table VIII for the EU 25).  
 
[Tables VII & VIII here] 
 
This imbalance results in the fact that economic majority and political majority are far from being 
synchronized in the EU 12 and the EU 25 (see Table IX). 
 
[Table IX here] 
 
Table X shows that 74 percent of the economic size in the EU 25 corresponds to 38 percent to 
48 percent of the political size depending on the measure chosen. In the EU 12, 71 percent of the 
economic size corresponds to 21 percent to 27 percent of the political size (the majority being at 
30 percent). Conversely, a solid “economic majority” (56 percent of economic size) represents 23 
percent to 32 percent of political size in the EU 25 and 14 percent to 18 percent (compared to a 
total of 60 percent) in the EU 12. 
 
We should clarify the choice of economic size rather than demographic size for comparison with 
political size (even if when they are expressed in percentage terms, they only differ little).  
 
                                                 
12 Op. cit., p. 182. 
The issue of size in the EU is almost always considered, in the political and academic field, from 
the strictly political point of view. The reason for this is that voting rights are legally distributed in 
the EU Treaty according to a “principle of population:” the larger the state in terms of 
inhabitants, the higher the number of votes. But this criterion does not fit in our framework. Our 
focus in this paper is the EU as an economic democracy between states (as we have tried to 
define it with the criteria of “integrity” and “efficiency”). While models to build political voice 
and assess EU’s democratic character typically rely on demographic size, we thus prefer the 
criterion of economic size, in relation to our argument in Section 6.  
 
What would be the point of a “Great European compromise?” For scholars of the history of 
federal states and institutions, this reference is no surprise (see Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004c) 
for the “Great compromise” was the name given to the agreement reached in July 1787 between 
small and large states in the Philadelphia Convention. The “Virginia Plan,” devised by James 
Madison and presented by Edmund Randolph to preserve the interest of the large states in the 
Union, equated political power (in the Congress) with demographic size. As such, it was rejected 
by smaller states. They instead proposed the “New Jersey Plan,” drafted by William Paterson, 
which would leave the structure of Congress unchanged, with each state having one vote. The 
famous solution later proposed by Roger Sherman, that eventually became the constitutional one, 
balanced the proportional (“apportioned”) representation of the House of representatives with 
the equal representation in the Senate (one state, two votes). What form could such an 
agreement, designed to restore efficiency to the European economic constitutional provisions by 
reducing the power of small states, take in the European Union? Can one imagine a compromise 
between an “Ireland Plan” and a “Germany Plan?” 
 
To have a clear idea of the possibility of reaching such an agreement, one can briefly look back at 
the tumultuous recent history of decision-making in the EU. The substantial efficiency, as we 
have tried to define it (see Section 2 and Section 6), was actually never considered with respect to 
size. But the formal efficiency of constitutional rules, i.e. the fact that they could allow (or not) 
for decisions to be taken (whatever their content) has been at the centre of a heated debate 
between small, medium and large states in the EU in the recent period. 
 
Because they were aware of the increased difficulty of making collective decisions in a Union that 
was to become more numerous and more heterogeneous, the national governments of the EU15 
countries had decided to reform the decision-making rules of the Council before enlarging the 
EU. Indeed, this reform was the major, if not only, objective of the Intergovernmental 
conference (IGC) convened in 2000 to draft what was to become the Nice Treaty.  
 
But the weighting scheme and the triple threshold for qualified majority (72 percent of the votes 
in the Council, representing at least 50 percent of the member states and at least 62 percent of 
the EU population) agreed upon are highly complex and hardly transparent. They mostly make it 
fairly easy for countries to form a blocking minority coalition, so that the decision-making 
process is most likely not to be efficient.13 Adopted precipitously without any simulation of how 
it would actually function, this qualified majority rule immediately appeared to be too complex, 
inefficient and probably inconsistent in a Union of 25 or more members (Baldwin and Widgrén, 
2004a). Realizing that Nice rules would not be sustainable, the European Convention tried to 
address this issue but did not eventually manage to propose a satisfying “great compromise” 
between European nations.  
 
The Convention proposed a simpler and apparently more efficient rule: a double majority 
threshold, with 50 percent of the member states representing at least 60 percent of the EU 
population. But these lower thresholds gave more power – especially veto power – to “large” 
member states, thus relatively weakening the blocking powers of coalitions of “small” member 
states, but mostly that of the two “medium” countries – Poland and Spain – which benefit the 
most from the compromise reached in Nice (Laurent and Le Cacheux, 2004b and 2004c). In 
addition, the efficiency gain compared to the Nice decision rules, although real, was actually not 
very significant (Baldwin and Widgrén, 2004b). 
 
Following the failure of the Brussels summit in December 2003, mostly due to the opposition of 
the Polish and Spanish governments to what was clearly a loss of influence of these countries 
compared to what they had gained in Nice, a new round of negotiations, this time within the 
Intergovernmental conference, led to the adoption of higher thresholds for the double majority 
rule in the Council. The majority rule adopted in the ECT (and presented in its Article I-25) was 
the following:  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 On the probabilities of reaching decision on collective issues with the qualified majority rules of the 
Nice Treaty, see Bobay (2001) and (2004). 
 
1. A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, 
comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 
% of the population of the Union. A blocking minority must include at least four Council 
members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained. 
 
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, when the Council does not act on a proposal 
from the Commission or from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the qualified 
majority shall be defined as at least 72 % of the members of the Council, representing 
Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union. 
 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply to the European Council when it is acting by a qualified 
majority. 
 
 
Whereas the double majority rule that had been originally proposed by the Convention – 50 
percent of the member states representing at least 60 percent of the EU population – could be 
regarded as both simple and potentially more efficient than the qualified majority rules of the 
Nice Treaty, the thresholds finally adopted represented actually a small progress. According to 
the calculations made by Baldwin and Widgrén (2004b), the probability of reaching collective 
decisions would have risen from about 5 percent under Nice rules to a little less than 10 percent 
under the new rules with the 25 present member states, and even slightly more with 27 or 28 
(including Turkey, in this case).14 With the already signed accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the 
double majority thresholds amount to 15 states and at least 310 millions EU citizens; and if 
Turkey were to join, the thresholds would be 15 states and at least 360 millions EU citizens.  
 
An additional condition, adopted at the end of the IGC negotiations in Brussels in June 2004, 
stated that a blocking minority had to include at least four states, a condition that turns out to be 
binding only for “large” countries, but not for “small” ones. In order to illustrate the properties 
of this particular double majority rule, and especially the numerous possibilities of forming 
blocking coalitions, we may give a few examples. A coalition of the six founding countries 
(Germany, Benelux, France and Italy), or even one that would not include France or Italy, could 
oppose any decision in the Council; the same could be achieved by a coalition of the 12 new 
members in the enlarged Union at 27, or indeed any coalition representing at least 170 millions 
citizens; and in a situation like that prevailing in the Spring of 2003, Italy, Poland, Spain and the 
UK could have opposed any common decision on Iraq. 
 
                                                 
14 See also the calculations performed by Bobay (2004). The author reaches similar conclusions concerning 
the decision-making efficiency of the rules eventually included in the ECT and insists on the power gained 
by “small” states. 
 
Now that the ECT is invalidated, the EU is back to the Nice Treaty rules, which are certainly 
worse in terms of efficiency than the first Convention compromise, but not that far from the 
second one, eventually proposed for ratification. The problem of efficiency, considered from a 
strictly formal point of view remains, and the risk of paralysis of the EU under the Nice rules are 
high. 
 
Furthermore, the sequence of bargaining on political size opened by the prospect of a new 
European constitution illustrate the difficulty of negotiating in a more numerous and diverse EU 
than ever before. Achieving a European “Great compromise” could thus prove very difficult for 
the very reason it is necessary: the imbalance between small and large states and the existence of 
medium ones as potential veto players. Table X shows that one important reason why the US 
succeeded in reaching an agreement between small and large states was their almost perfect 
balance, reducing the veto power of the medium states. 
 
 
 [Table X here] 
 
But a more fundamental question is to determine, not if a “Great compromise” in the EU 25 is 
possible, but if it is desirable, i.e. whether a rebalance of power in favor of large states would be 
enough to insure that more balanced constitutional rules might be chosen. Here, one has to 
remember that the small economy rules that have been chosen for the EU 12 and that appear so 
harmful for its economic performances have been essentially pushed forward by France and 
Germany. So, ultimately, the reason why a “Great compromise” appears unlikely to trigger 
efficiency is because large states could well end up not choosing the good rules for themselves.  
 
However, the growing opposition between large and small countries in the EU should not be 
understated. The vote of 25 November 2003 on the SGP can be read as a (nuanced) size-driven 
opposition between France and Germany (that did not take part in the final vote) on the one 
hand (supported by Italy and Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece), and The 
Netherlands, Finland, Austria and Spain on the other hand, which voted against the conclusions 
of the EU Council suspending the sanctions contained in the excessive deficit procedure.  
 
Second, if a global reform appears unlikely, some incremental improvements toward a new 
balance between “large” and “small” states in the EU on the basis of economic size seem 
possible. An interesting reform in this respect regards the European central bank that modified 
its status in April 2003, introducing for the first time in relation to the enlargement of the euro 
area the criterion of economic size instead of population (or demographic size) and recognizing a 
specific status to the five countries with the highest GDP in the euro area (Art. 10.2):  
 
Each member of the Governing Council shall have one vote. As from the date on which 
the number of members of the Governing Council exceeds 21, each member of the 
Executive Board shall have one vote and the number of governors with a voting right 
shall be 15. The latter voting rights shall be assigned and shall rotate as follows: 
 
– as from the date on which the number of governors exceeds 15, until it reaches 22, the 
governors shall be allocated to two groups, according to a ranking of the size of the share 
of their national central bank’s Member State in the aggregate gross domestic product at 
market prices and in the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial 
institutions of the Member States which have adopted the euro. The shares in the 
aggregate gross domestic product at market prices and in the total aggregated balance 
sheet of the monetary financial institutions shall be assigned weights of 5/6 and 1/6, 
respectively. The first group shall be composed of five governors and the second group 
of the remaining governors.  
 
 
In this respect, Table VIII and X show that beyond (or more accurately within) the question of 
the balance between small and large countries in the EU lies the question of the balance between 
the EU and the euro area. This leads us to our final argument: the constitutional differentiation 
of the euro area, or the implementation of the European economic constitutions. 
 
 
The European economic constitution(s)  
 
Admiring the young states of the new American republic, Tocqueville (mistakenly) remarked in 
Chapter VIII, Volume I of his Democracy in America that “One is much like another. Their mores, 
ideas, and needs are homogeneous. Though some are larger than others, differences of size alone 
have not given rise to strongly opposing interests.”15 
 
Uniting the euro area countries enough by giving them a true economic sovereignty so that the 
difference in their sizes would not be a threat to the future of the EU is the idea behind the 
“European economic constitution(s).”  
 
                                                 
15 Op. cit., p. 134. 
Going back to Table VII and Table IX, it appears that the euro area is heavily dependent on the 
EU for the implementation of its own policies. Given the concentric circles structure of the 
European economic constitution, this is not surprising. But the imbalance between the economic 
size and the political size in the euro area and the EU is as striking as that between small and 
large countries in the EU. Actually, members of the euro area only account for 60 percent of its 
political size in the Council. While the Council makes decisions that allow for a certain degree of 
autonomy of the euro area on the policy level, the dependence of the euro area on the constitutional 
level is total. EU 12 countries can not choose their Economic constitution without the agreement 
of the 13 other countries and of the ECB.  
 
Furthermore, Table IX shows that the consistency between economic size and political size is not 
better in the EU 12 than in the EU 25, or, to say the same thing differently, that the EU 12 is not 
more integrated politically than the EU 25, while it is much more integrated economically.  
 
Two imperatives thus finally appear. The first is to better differentiate the EU 12 within the EU 
25 in terms of economic constitutional choice; the second is to integrate the EU 12 politically at 
the level of its economic integration. This would provide the foundations for a sustainable 
economic and monetary union. These two ambitions can only be met through a differentiation 
between the two European economic constitutions corresponding to the EU 25 and the EU 12.  
 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) formalize the “optimal size” of countries in public economics terms 
as resulting from a trade-off between the efficiency of the provision of public goods (economies 
of scale) and the heterogeneity of preferences. This is a generalization of the classic argument of 
the economic federalism theory16 on the optimal level of public policy within federations 
(“subsidiarity” in EU parlance). In the constitutional framework that we have chosen, this 
optimal trade-off is between efficiency and integrity. In theory, it should in fact be related to the 
issue of optimal (external) size. There should be a coalition of countries that, given their 
characteristics in terms of diversity both according to their social model and their size, makes it 
possible to minimize integrity and efficiency costs. Once more, we turn to Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962) to illustrate this idea of an “optimal constitution” in the EU (see Chart XVII). 
 
[Chart XVII here] 
 
                                                 
16 See Oates (1999).  
How do we define the boundaries of this coalition of countries, or, to put it in Buchanan’s (1965) 
terms, how do we justify an “optimal exclusion” (and inclusion) in the EU? There, we have to 
add to our normative framework an unmistakable positive reality: twelve EU countries have 
already decided to give up their monetary sovereignty to form the euro area. The question is thus 
not how to form the coalition of countries that would minimize integrity and efficiency costs, but 
how to effectively reduce integrity and efficiency costs for this coalition given the fact that it 
exists. As argued, the two steps in this direction would have to be autonomy and integration.  
 
Autonomy in the constitutional choice of economic policies rules implies that integrity and 
efficiency costs would be reduced simultaneously by respecting two conditions. The first is that 
the rules chosen in the euro area are general and take into account the size of member states. 
This means that euro area countries should reform the rules of monetary and fiscal policies in the 
course of a “small compromise” leading to an efficient and proactive macroeconomic framework. 
It should be easier than a “great compromise” because of the presence of only 66 percent of 
small states and 1 medium state in the euro area, instead of 76 percent and 2 medium member 
states in the EU as a whole. Only then would the large and small states be on an equal footing.  
 
Since the UK and Poland remain outside the euro area, the latter comprises 4 of the 6 large 
countries of the EU. If the UK and Poland keep their macroeconomic autonomy and use it to 
compensate the handicap of their size in the Single market, giving the euro area an economic 
constitution respecting the integrity and efficiency principles makes it possible to ease the 
consequences of the “size nexus.”  
 
A further important question would be to know what kind of rules a European economic 
constitution for the euro area should have. There, a trade-off in the trade-off could appear 
between revision and neutrality, the euro area members being able to take the risk of political 
integration (with a revisable economic constitution) because preferences would become close 
enough under the effect of more neutral rules. In the classical terms of federalism, this idea 
means allowing for homogenous preferences to form at the level where externalities and 
economies of scale occur. An important step toward further integration once autonomy is gained 
would be to define “European public goods” financed by a real autonomous budget paid for by a 
unified corporate tax (see Laurent & Le Cacheux, 2004).  
 
Two different economic constitutions should thus be implemented in the EU 25. The first one, 
the “EU economic constitution,” would be submitted to the EU 25 member states and legally 
bind them. Including the main elements of the first historical economic constitution, it would 
combine the regulations of the Single market (and the competition policy attached to it) with a 
reformed EU budget (see Le Cacheux 2005). Member states should be left free regarding their 
macroeconomic policies.  
 
The second economic constitution would really be the “euro area Constitution.” Submitted only 
to the ratification of euro area members and amendable by them only, it would be revisable 
through qualified majority and include neutral and efficient provisions regarding monetary, 
exchange rate and fiscal policies taking into account size.17 
 
In the end, the major reason why the “European constitution(s)” solution seems better suited for 
the EU is that it answers our “integrity” and “size nexus” concerns in a less costly way, in 
efficiency sense, than the “Great compromise.”  
 
 
 
4. Epilogue: 1955 or 1965? 
 
The solutions proposed to the current predicament of the EU (which present crisis is a symptom 
of) rely ultimately on one possibly heroic assumption: that the EU has the political resources to 
invent innovative new political paths into the future. If the time is 1955, at the moment when the 
Messina conference opened the way for the Treaty of Rome after the European Defense 
Community crisis, then our optimism is justified. If the time is 1965, when the “Luxembourg 
compromise” blocked the way of European integration, that only the Single Act, 20 years later, 
revived, then it is simply, for now, misplaced.  
 
                                                 
17 See Laurent & Le Cacheux (2004a), (2004b) and (2004c). 
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Table I 
DEMOGRAPHIC SIZE IN THE EU 25 (AND EU 12) IN 2003  
                                                   in million 
Country? 
 
Population * 
Malta  0.4 
Luxembourg  0.4 
Cyprus  0.7 
Estonia  1.4 
Slovenia  2.0 
Latvia  2.3 
Lithuania  3.5 
Ireland 4.0 
Finland  5.2 
Slovakia  5.4 
Denmark  5.4 
Austria  8.1 
Sweden  8.9 
Hungary  10.1 
Czech Republic  10.2 
Belgium  10.4 
Portugal  10.4 
Greece  11.0 
Netherlands  16.2 
 
Poland  
 
38.2 
Spain  40.7 
 
Italy  
 
57.3 
United Kingdom 59.3 
France  59.6 
Germany  
 
 
? Euro area members in bold. 
82.5 
 
 
* As of January 1, 2003. 
      
 «MEDIUM»  
          (2, 1) 
    «SMALL» 
       (19, 8) 
     «LARGE» 
          (4, 3)  
 
 
 
20 m 
 
  41 m 
Note: A “small” state is defined as one with a population inferior to the fourth of the population of the 
biggest state. A “medium” state is defined as one with a population inferior to half of the population of 
the biggest state. “Large” states are those remaining. 
 
 
 
Table II 
ECONOMIC SIZE IN THE EU 25 IN 2003 
(GDP AT 1995 MARKET PRICE) 
 
 
         in million euros 
 
Country? 
 
 
Malta 3060.0 
Estonia 4587.5 
Latvia 6006.9 
Lithuania 7473.4 
Cyprus 9141.7 
Slovakia 20157.2 
Slovenia 20547.5 
Luxembourg 20822.5 
Hungary 45952.8 
Czech Republic 49084.2 
Ireland 94028.1 
Portugal 100791.6 
Greece 120580.7 
Finland 132971.4 
Poland 141918.2 
Denmark 161290.0 
Austria 218603.4 
Sweden 232715.9 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
249184.9 
386653.6 
  
 
Spain 591615.8 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
944964.5 
UK 1086470.6
France 1442220.8
Germany 2159784.9
 
? Euro area members in bold. 
 
 
Note: A “small” state is defined as one with a GDP inferior to the fourth of the GDP of the biggest state. 
A “medium” state is defined as one with a GDP inferior to half of the GDP of the biggest state. “Large” 
states are those remaining. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Chart IV 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: A SIMPLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*: Empirical sign of the relation (see infra). 
**: Number of EU 12 countries for which a significant relation was empirically found (see infra).
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Box I 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: A BASIC EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
 
 
 
— The data — 
 
Given the small number of countries belonging to the euro area (12 in 2006) and its young age (the Euro 
was launched in 1999 and became public in 2002), a lot of studies assessing the performance of the 
European economy crucially rely on “subjective data,” following the concepts developed and publicized 
by the OECD. The most widely used are, quantitatively, the “output gap” (and its derivatives: “structural” 
growth, “structural” unemployment…) and, qualitatively, “labor market rigidity” indexes (such as 
“employment protection,” “coordination,” “centralization”…). 
 
In order to test our hypotheses we have chosen instead to rely on (the most possible) “objective” and 
recent freely available data. They largely come from Eurostat (with the exception of “openness” data, 
which come from OECD). This choice has its own serious limitations.  
 
Our data cover the 1996-2003/2004 period. This is the only timeframe where two conditions are satisfied 
in order to evaluate the effects of the European economic constitution and the related issue of (country) 
size. First, the European economic constitution, partly implemented in 1993 and renewed in 1992 (see 
Section 4), is in place by the beginning of the period and fully in effect by the middle of it. Second, a 
certain convergence has taken place before the beginning of our period (although we show that it was not 
deepened by the European economic constitution).  
 
Our dataset comprises 11 of the 12 euro area countries. We have chosen not to include Spain because it is 
the only “medium” country of the EU12. Our results thus really shed light on the gap in performance 
between “large” (the “big 3”) and “small” (the “small 8”) countries of the euro area.    
 
If size really matters, as we argue, then our results could be very fragile. The dataset on which we perform 
our estimations can indeed seem very small by the standard of contemporary econometrics. However, one 
should keep in mind that ours is not a sample, but the population itself. By the same token, the exclusion 
of one or more outliers in some regressions is in our view counterbalanced by their economic significance. 
None do encompass less than 94 percent of the EU 11 GDP, 62 percent of the small states and 100 
percent of large states. Furthermore, even if the number of observations is obviously small, each is an 
average calculated on the 1996-2004 period. Finally, correlation coefficients and individual coefficients 
obtained are quite strong. To further allow the reader to test the validity of our methodology, we have 
added a table containing our data that we use to compare them to other countries outside the euro area 
(Table V and Section 6). It shows that “estimations” provided by means are close to those obtained by 
OLS regression.  
 
 
— The theoretical framework — 
 
The issue is to determine how our theoretical framework (described in Chart IV) compares to standard 
economic theory. Two questions emerge. The first one is the relation between population and growth 
levels. We assume that the two are highly correlated and that population causes GDP levels and not the 
other way around. In doing so, we rely on the basic assumptions underlying the standard production 
function that relates population (labor, skilled or not), capital and technical progress to output. But one 
could then argue that population should be represented by the labor force and not total population. 
However this measure would only account for production and not consumption, while we are interested 
in the size of the domestic market.  
 
Another related question is how to avoid the reverse causation between size and macroeconomic 
performance. If GDP levels are used as the size variable, then high inflation and low public deficit could 
cause high GDP levels, and not the reverse. This is why we use demographic size as a proxy for economic 
size. Demographic size is almost perfectly correlated to economic size and the direction of this correlation 
is un-ambiguous. The direction of the correlation between demographic size and economic performances 
is also un-ambiguous.  
 
A further assumption is that since demographic size is a proxy for economic size, economic size is 
mediated by openness, which effect on growth captures both the importance of openness and, conversely, 
the importance of the domestic market. We can indeed write approximately that GDP = domestic market 
+ trade with the world. Hence that domestic market = GDP-openness (defined as the trade to GDP 
ratio).  
 
Our measure of demographic size, in percentage of the total, is unconventional. As explained in Section 6, 
we wanted a comparative measure of demographic size and not an absolute one (like logs of population), 
i.e. a significant measure of the weight of each country in the euro area. 
 
 
— The models —  
 
We estimate four models:  
 
1) The first one reveals approximations and mediations between demographic size, economic size and 
openness when regressed on real economic growth (Table V-A);  
 
2) The second one attempts to test the quality of the univariate regression of size on growth by 
confronting it to two other hypotheses: the “social nexus” and the endogenous growth theory (Table V-
B);  
 
3) In the third, which is two-fold (Table V-C & Table V-D), inflation and public deficit regressions are 
tested to see if the only effect of openness on their variances runs through growth or if a direct effect of 
size exists on either or both;  
 
4) Finally, size regressions on unemployment and long-term unemployment are tested against the “social 
nexus” hypothesis (Table V-E & Table V-F).  
 
 
 
— The results —  
 
- We first find, as expected, that size influences real growth in the EU 12. Economic size is proxied by 
demographic size and size is mediated by openness in influencing the real growth of GDP.  
 
- Our results are also useful to understand the effect of size on the conduct of macroeconomic policy in 
the euro area. In particular, they reveal a systematic divergence between small and large countries in terms 
of inflation and public deficit. However, the inflation coefficient is weaker and more fragile than the 
public deficit coefficient, which appears on the contrary too strong. As regards inflation, the reason might 
be that the European economic and monetary integration has lowered the importance of domestic factors 
in predicting accurately inflation rates. Another explanation could be the consequence of competitive 
strategies undertaken by small countries in the European context. Whatever the reasons, the weakness of 
the coefficient must not lead to the conclusion that size and monetary policy are merely un-related. The 
consequence of a uniform restrictive monetary policy on large countries and on euro area weighted 
growth appears very real (see Chart VIII). As for public deficits, the direct effect of size is positive: the 
bigger the economy, the larger the need for macro stabilization, the bigger the deficit. 
 
- We find that GDP per capita and real GDP growth are negatively correlated with size in the EU 12 and 
that openness is strongly and negatively correlated with size. Size, it seems, determines openness that in 
turn determines growth, inflation and public deficit performance. The results presented in Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003) suggest that GDP per capita and real GDP growth should be positively associated with 
size, but that openness*size should be negatively correlated with both, giving small open economies a 
comparative advantage in a globalized world. Our results being contradictory to this finding, we are able 
to interpret them as the symptom of the development of a specific kind of growth process in the euro area 
brought about by the implementation of the European economic constitution.  
 
- Our results, as limited as they are, could thus shed some light on the nature of the European growth. 
One would expect, according to a standard result of the endogenous growth theory, that GDP per capita 
and GDP levels would be connected to growth rates and, from there, to macroeconomic performances. 
As noted in Alesina, Spolaore & Warcziarg (2005), “scale effects may be more present in the increasing 
returns, endogenous growth phase that characterises advanced industrialized countries.” We find the 
opposite: GDP levels, represented by population levels, and GDP per capita levels, are negatively 
correlated to growth rates.  
 
The growth process in the EU therefore appears more “Smithian” than “Schumpeterian” (Parker, 1984), 
but in a very specific way. We propose to call it “Millian” in reference to the arguments developed by J. S. 
Mill on the impact of country size on trade benefits (see Section 6). Hence, the “Millian” growth in the 
EU designates the bias of the growth process in favor of small open countries that end up doing 
systematically better than large ones under the European economic constitution. The (Solow) hypothesis 
of a simple catch-up by small member states should be rejected both because of the dynamic shown in 
Table IV-A and IV-B and of the results of the regression of GDP per capita level on growth.  
 
- Finally, our last result regards the existence of a “social nexus” in the euro area. We find that the “size 
nexus” does a much better job at explaining differences in unemployment and long-term unemployment 
than a “social model” based explanation (see Charts IX to X and Section 6 for an explanation).  
 
 
 
 
 
Chart V 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: DEVELOPMENT & GROWTH 
 
 
Size and economic development
y = -1,2495x + 17,515
R2 = 0,3502
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
Demographic size 1993 (in %)
G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 in
de
x 
va
ria
tio
n 
19
96
-2
00
4
 
  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 24.08 
Coefficient significant at 5 %. 
 
 
                              
Size and real growth
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Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 2.3 
Coefficient significant at 5 %. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Chart VI 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” IN THE EU 12: OPENNESS  
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OLS regression without Greece.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 42. 
Coefficient significant at 10 %. 
 
 
Size and openness dynamics
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OLS regression without Greece and Finland.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 21. 
Coefficient significant at 10%.  
 
Source: OECD. 
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Chart VII 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” AND MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
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OLS regression without Greece, Finland and Austria.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 0.73 
Coefficient significant at 10%.     
 
 
 
Size and public finances
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OLS regression without Greece.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 3.12 
Coefficient significant at 1 %. 
   
Source: Eurostat. 
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Chart VIII 
THE “SIZE PENALTY” OF MONETARY POLICY 
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Source: Eurostat. 
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Table III-A 
THE “SIZE NEXUS”: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
Productivity of labor 
(GDP per hour worked, in 1990 $) 
     
     
 1950 1973 1990 1998 
   
 
  
Austria   4.05 15.17 24.05 27.07 
Belgium 6.19 16.89 27.44 33.57 
Finland   4.28 13.81 20.27 25.69 
Ireland 3.73 9.84 21.66 27.05 
Netherlands  6.67 19.49 30.15 30.62 
 
Average Small 5* 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
15 
 
 
24.7 
 
 
28.8 
 
 
Italy 4.38 15.92 24.08 27.9 
France 5.82 18.02 29.47 33.72 
Germany 3.99 14.76 21.94 26.56 
     
Average Big 3  4.7 16.2 25.2 29.4 
 
Convergence 
diff. Small(s)-Large(s) 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
 
-1.19 
 
 
 
-0.45 
 
 
 
-0.59 
 
 
 
Convergence 
 (std. dev. EU 12*) 1.15 2.93 3.72 3.19 
     
Average EU 12* 4.89 15.49 24.88 29.02 
     
USA 12.65 23.72 30.10 34.55 
     
Catch-up  
(diff. USA-EU 12*) 7.76 8.23 5.22 5.53 
 
* No data for Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece. 
 
 
 
 
Table III-B 
THE “SIZE NEXUS”: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
GDP per capita 
(in 1990 $) 
     
     
 1950 1973 1990 1998 
   
 
  
Austria   3706 11235 16881 18905 
Belgium 5462 12170 17194 19442 
Finland   4253 11085 16868 18324 
Ireland 3446 6867 11825 18183 
Netherlands  5996 13082 17267 20224 
 
 
Average Small 5* 
 
 
4573 
 
 
10888 
 
 
16007 
 
 
19016 
 
 
Spain 2397 8739 12210 14227 
Italy 3502 10643 16320 17759 
France 5270 13123 18093 19558 
Germany 3881 11966 15932 17799 
     
Average Big 3  4218 11911 16782 18372 
 
Convergence 
diff. Small(s)-Large(s) 
 
355 
 
-1023 
 
-775 
 
644 
 
Convergence 
(std. dev. EU 12*)  993 1994 1919 903 
     
Average EU 12 4440 11271 16298 18774 
     
USA 9561 16689 23214 27331 
     
Catch-up  
(diff. USA-EU 12*) 5122 5418 6917 8557 
     
 
* No data for Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece. 
 
 
Note: according to Abramovitz (1989), “catch-up” is the narrowing of the productivity gap 
compared to the leading country and “convergence” is the narrowing of the gap among follower 
countries. 
 
Source: A. Madison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD, 2001) and own 
computations. 
Table IV 
THE SIZE NEXUS: A GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Country Demographic 
size 
2003 
 
 
Population 
share in EU 
12 (in %) 
Economic 
size 
2003 
 
 
GDP level 
share in EU 
12 (in %) 
GDP per 
capita in 
2003 
 
 
Index 
EU 25=100
Real GDP 
growth 
 
 
 
Average 
1996-2004
Inflation 
 
 
 
 
Average 
1996-2004 
Public finance 
balance 
 
 
 
Average 
1996-2004 
 
Luxembourg 0.13 0. 32 213 5.19 2.07 2.15 
 
Ireland 1.2 1.46 136 7.73 3.14 1.13 
 
Portugal 3.36 1.56 77 2.54 2.88 -3.12 
 
Greece 3.51 1.87 81 3.89 4.09 -4.88 
 
Finland 1.7 2.06 113 3.62 1.57 2.24 
 
Austria 2.66 3.38 121 2.26 1.51 -0.63 
 
Belgium 3.39 3.86 117 2.16 1.71 -0.78 
 
Netherlands 5.13 5.98 126 2.41 2.44 -0.92 
Mean/median 
“small eight” 2.63/3.01 2.88/2.06 123/119 3.73/3.08 2.43/2.25 -0.60/-0.70 
 
Sweden∆ 2* 3* 114 2.73 1.51 1.82 
 
Iceland and Norway - - 131.15 3.47 2.44 4.56 
 
Italy 19.14 14.62 106 1.18 2.47 -3.02 
 
France 19.32 22.32 112 2.32 1.63 -3.03 
 
Germany 27.27 33.42 109 1.41 1.26 -3.04 
Mean/median 
 “big three”  21.91/19.32 23.4/22.32 109/109 1.64/1.41 1.79/1.63 -3.03/-3.03 
 
UK 
 
13* 
 
13* 
 
118 
 
2.89 
 
1.47 
 
-1.55 
 
USA and Canada18 
 
- 
 
- 
 
140.7 
 
3.3 
 
2.4 
 
-0.3 
 
Stand. dev. EU 11 
 
 
9.33 
 
10.97 
 
35.70 
 
1.90 
 
0.86 
 
2.37 
 
Source: Eurostat 
                                                 
∆ Sweden was chosen as the typical non-Euro area small country over Denmark because the latter is a member of the 
exchange rate mechanism II (ERM II). As such it is closer to the third-phase of EMU (see Chart VIII). 
* In the EU 25. 
18 1996-2003 data. 
Table V 
THE “SIZE NEXUS”: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Table V-A: size(s), openness and growth 
 
 
 
 
         Table V-B: size and growth 
                                                          Dependent variable: growth rate of real GDP 1996-2004 
 (1) 
SIZE NEXUS  
 
(2)  
ENDOGENOUS 
(3) 
SOCIAL 
(4) 
GLOBAL 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
-0.119467** 
( 0.055102) 
 
-0.113155* 
 (0.053887) 
 
-0.099593** 
(0.042840) 
 
-0.102224*** 
(0.032271) 
 
GDP per capita level 
1995 
 
- 
-0.033993 
 (0.030799) 
 
 
- 
-0.042609** 
(0.016792) 
 
Productivity  
average 1996-2004 
 
- 
0.066970 
(0.043118) 
 
 
- 
0.059866** 
(0.022038) 
 
Social transfers  
by public administrations 
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
 
- 
0.246975 
 (0.227024) 
 
0.337888* 
(0.194458) 
 
Total expenditures  
by public administrations  
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.330765** 
(0.118488) 
 
-0.361905*** 
(0.099215) 
 
Constant 4.098371*** 
(0.655377) 
 
0.444848 
 (2.967036) 
 
15.85544*** 
(3.328531) 
 
14.09211*** 
(3.367158) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries 11 11 11 11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 
 
0.30 
 
0.66 
 
0.82 
 
 
                                                          Dependent variable: growth rate of real GDP 1996-2004 
 (1) 
DEMO. SIZE 
 
(2) 
ECO. SIZE 
(3) 
OPENNESS 
(4) 
SIZE & SIZE 
(5) 
OPEN * SIZE 
Demographic size 
Population 1993 
-0.119467** 
( 0.055102) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.295037 
(0.337969) 
 
 
- 
Economic size 
GDP 1993 
 
- 
-0.094372* 
(0.047522) 
 
 
- 
0.149349 
(0.283310) 
 
 
- 
Openness 
1995 
 
- 
 
- 
0.057511* 
(0.027953) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Openness * Demo. 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.005718** 
(0.002303) 
 
 
Number of EU 12 countries 11 11 11 11 11 
Constant 4.098371*** 
(0.655377) 
 
3.943648*** 
(0.641852) 
 
0.835909 
(1.232896) 
 
4.236735*** 
(0.732038) 
 
4.449751*** 
(0.699296) 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 
 
0.30 
 
0.32 
 
0.20 
 
0.40 
 
 
 
Table V-C:  size and inflation  
                                                             Dependent variable: inflation rate average 1996-2004 
 (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
(2) 
OPENNESS 
(3)  
REAL GROWTH 
(4) 
ECO. SIZE 
 
(5) 
OPEN * SIZE 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
-0.037899* 
(0.020308) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Economic size  
GDP 1993 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.035862** 
(0.015536) 
 
 
- 
Openness  
1995 
 
- 
0.011999 
 (0.012364) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Real GDP growth 
Average 1996-2004 
 
- 
 
- 
0.159782 
 (0.099710) 
 
 
- 
 
- 
Openness * Demo 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.001770* 
(0.000935) 
 
Constant 
 
2.573971*** 
(0.281189) 
 
1.667945** 
(0.793440) 
 
1.701791*** 
(0.373803) 
 
2.582737*** 
(0.245088) 
2.702412*** 
(0.330068) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries 8 8 8 8 8 
R-squared 
 
0.36 
 
0.13 
 
0.29 
 
0.47 
 
0.37 
 
 
 
Table V-D:  size and public deficit 
                                                     Dependent variable: public finance balance average 1996-2004 
 (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
(2) 
OPENNESS 
(3)  
REAL GROWTH 
(4) 
ECO. SIZE 
 
(5) 
OPEN * SIZE 
 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
-0.162605*** 
(0.053515) 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Economic size  
GDP 1993 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.126605** 
(0.049092) 
 
 
- 
Openness  
1995 
 
- 
0.077691** 
(0.032350) 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Real GDP growth 
Average 1996-2004 
 
- 
 
- 
0.776517*** 
(0.267822) 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
Openness * Demo 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
-0.007558*** 
(0.002312) 
 
Constant 0.454360 
 (0.664916) 
 
 
-4.214149** 
(1.486222) 
 
-3.293536*** 
(0.968026) 
 
0.243864 
 (0.695020) 
 
0.936114 
(0.734719) 
 
Number of EU 12 
countries 
10 10 10 10 
 
10 
 
R-squared 0.53 
 
0.41 
 
0.51 
 
0.50 
 
0.51 
 
 
 
 
 
Table V-E:  size and unemployment 
 
Dependent variable: unemployment rate average 1996-2004 
 (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
 
(2) 
SIZE NEXUS VS. SOCIAL NEXUS 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
0.200113*** 
(0.066216) 
 
0.225346** 
(0.091045) 
 
Social transfers  
by public administrations 
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
-0.360709 
 (0.439331) 
 
Total expenditures  
by public administrations  
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
0.182733 
 (0.225272) 
 
Constant 4.754781*** 
(0.866414) 
 
1.451946* 
(6.549308) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries 9 9 
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 
 
0.39 
 
 
 
 
 
Table V-F:  size and long-term unemployment 
 
Dependent variable: long-term unemployment rate average 1996-2004 
 (1) 
SIZE NEXUS 
 
(2) 
SIZE NEXUS VS. SOCIAL NEXUS 
Demographic size  
Population 1993 
 
0.114498** 
(0.044705) 
 
 
0.124990* 
(0.058325) 
 
Social transfers  
by public administrations 
average 1996-2003 
 
- 
-0.172626 
 (0.302924) 
 
Total expenditures  
by public administrations  
average 1996-2003 
- 0.092006 
 (0.158754) 
 
Constant 2.061090 ** 
(0.555452) 
 
0.286653 
 (4.477501) 
 
Number of EU 12 countries 10 10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
 
All regressions were estimated using OLS and data from Eurostat and OECD. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Individual coefficients *significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level or ***1% level. All Eurostat 
data are available at http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/. OECD “openness” data are available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ 
 
Chart IX 
A “SOCIAL NEXUS” IN THE EU 12? 
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Country 
 
Model 
 
Degree of  redistribution 
 
Actual rounded 
coefficient19 
 
Belgium Continental 3 1.8 
Germany Continental 3 1.8 
Greece Mediterranean 2 1.5 
Spain Mediterranean 2 1.5 
France Continental 3 1.8 
Ireland Liberal 1 1 
Italy Mediterranean 2 1.5 
Luxembourg Continental 3 1.8 
Netherlands Continental 3 1.8 
Austria Continental 3 1.8 
Portugal Mediterranean 2 1.5 
Finland Nordic 4 2 
 
  
 
Model 
Average 
Inter-model difference 
 
Intra-model difference 
 
Inter-model 
standard 
deviation 
 
Intra-model 
standard 
deviation 
 
Continental 6.1* 7.37 3.03 
Mediterranean 9.9* 8.12 3.38 
Liberal 6.4* 
Nordic 10.7* 
4.6 
 
  
 
2.3 
 
*Unemployment rate average 1996-2003, in %. 
                                                 
19Average social transfers by public administrations between 1996 and 2003, in % of GDP. Ireland=1, 
coefficient=model average. 
Sophisticated  
“social nexus” 
Unsophisticated 
 
 “social nexus” 
Chart X 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” VS THE “SOCIAL NEXUS” 
 
 
Size and unemployment
y = 0,2001x + 4,7548
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OLS regression without Greece and Finland.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 3. 9 
Coefficient significant at 1 %. 
 
 
 
Size and long-term unemployment
y = 0,1145x + 2,0611
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OLS regression without Greece.  
Difference between “small eight” and “big three” = 2. 2 
Coefficient significant at 5 %. 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Chart XI 
THE “SIZE NEXUS” VS THE “SOCIAL NEXUS” 
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Chart XII 
IRELAND: EU’S FINEST  
 
 
The “rags to riches” European success story... 
Ireland's catch-up and...surpass
(Gdp per capita in 1990 dollars)
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Source: A. Madison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 2003). 
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...relying heavily on a flourishing single market driven external trade. 
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Source: Economic Review and Outlook 2004, Ireland Department of Finance, accessed at 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications and Budgetary and Economic Statistics, Ireland 
Department of Finance, April 2005, accessed at http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications. 
Chart XIII 
THE “BIG THREE” AND THE EU 12:  A BASIC DECOMPOSITION 
EU 12 2003 GDP 
in % per member state, in crescent order
 Big three 
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Source: DESTATIS, INSEE and OECD. 
Table VI 
SINGLE MARKET DEPENDENCE RATIOS IN THE EU 1520 IN 2003 
     
 
Total trade in GDP 
(2003)  
Dependence on Single market ratio 
 
  
EU trade in total trade 
(2003) 
   
Country 
 
  
 
 
    
UK 29,9  57  17,02  
Italy 26,4  61  16,1  
France 27,7 
 
68  18,8 
Independent 
 
Germany 35,8  64,8  23,1  
Sweden 43,5 
 
64,4  28,01  
Portugal 37,5  79,9  29,9  
Denmark 43,7  71,5  31,2 Dependent 
Austria 48,8 
 
77,2  37,6  
Netherlands 65,5  68,1  44,6  
Ireland 89,8  62,4  56,03  
Belgium 86,3 
 
75,1  64,8 
Hyper-
dependent 
Luxembourg 139,8  82,4  115,1  
      
 
Size and Dependence
R2 = 0,2829
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Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
                                                 
20 Missing data for Finland. Spain and Greece are excluded.  
Chart XIV 
GERMANY AND THE “FROG STRATEGY” 
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Germany and the "frog strategy": exports and competitiveness
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Source: OECD.
                                                                        Chart XV 
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY: OLD AND NEW TRADE-OFFS 
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Chart XVI 
THE RISE OF THE “SMALLS” IN THE EU 
Number of states by size in the EEC and the EU 
 
50%*
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76% 
 77%
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"Small(s)"
"Medium(s)"
"Large(s)"
2007: If Romania and Bulgaria eventually integrate the EU then.  
* Percentage of small states in the European Economic communities and EU. 
 
 
Note: A “small” EEC and then EU member state is defined as one with a population inferior to the fourth 
of the population of the biggest state. A “medium” state is defined as one with a population inferior to 
half of the population of the biggest state. “Large” states are those remaining. 
Table VII 
ECONOMIC SIZE VS POLITICAL SIZE WITHIN THE EU 12 
Country Economic size 
(GDP in 2003) 
 
 
in % 
Political size 
(voting rights as of 2005 
i.e. Nice Treaty provisions) 
 
in % 
≈ Magnification  
(or minimization) 
 
Average political size 
economic size 
(or the opposite) 
 
 
ECB€ SGP% EU 
budget‰ 
 
Comp. 
policy 
Pol. 
size∑ 
Laurent & 
Le Cacheux 
vs. 
(unanimity) 
Using 
Banzhaf 
index21 
 
Luxembourg 0. 3 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-1 
 
4-1 
 
4-4 
 
4.8 
X 16.2  
(27.7) 1.3     X 4.3   
 
Ireland 1 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-2 
 
4-2 
 
4-4 
 
5.1 
X 5.1     
(8.3)   2.2      X 2.2 
 
Portugal 2 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-3 
 
4-4 
 
5.4 
X 2.7     
(4.1) 3.7      X 1.8 
 
Greece 2 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-3 
 
4-4 
 
5.4 
X 2.7    
(4.1) 3.7     X 1.8 
 
Finland 2 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-2 
 
4-2 
 
4-4 
 
5.1 
X 2.5    
(4.1) 2.2     X 1.1 
 
Austria 3 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-3 
 
4-2 
 
4-4 
 
5.2 
X 1.7    
(2.7) 3.1     X 1.03 
 
Belgium 4 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-3 
 
4-4 
 
5.4 X 1.3     (2) 3.7     ÷ 1.08 
 
Netherlands 6 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-4 
 
4-4 
 
4-4 
 
5.6 ÷ 1.06  (X 1.4) 4         ÷ 1.5 
 
Spain 9 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-8 
 
4-7 
 
4-4 
 
6.1 
÷ 1.4   
(1.08) 7.4      ÷ 1.2   
                                                 
€ The two numbers correspond respectively to the ability of amending and enforcing monetary 
rules. The six members of the Executive board (that form the Governing Council of the ECB 
together with the twelve national bankers) are not included in this count. Unlike for instance ECJ 
judges, they are not supposed to be nominated (or to act) on a national basis. Still, another way of 
calculating the votes would be to divide only 66% among the 12 member states (12 out of 18). 
However, we assume the remaining third to be “size-blind” as it should according to its mandate. 
This method would in any event be neutral for the value of coefficients in the last column. 
% Idem, but with respectively the Council’s ability to amend unanimously and implement by 
qualified majority the SGP. For the sake of simplification votes have been distributed among 
members of the EU 12. However, more than half of those votes actually belong to the other 
members of the EU 25, even the implementation of the “excessive deficit” procedure (a clear 
symptom of the lack of sovereignty of the EU 12 inside the EU 25, see Section 7). Romania and 
Bulgaria, included in the Nice Treaty agreement, are not taken into account here. 
‰ Ibidem, but with respectively the Council’s unanimity and the Parliament’s majority. The EU’s 
annual budget is jointly determined by the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament debates in 
two successive readings, and the budget does not come into force until it has been signed by the 
President of Parliament. The budgetary procedure or the budget’s content can not be amended 
without EU 25 members’ unanimity.  
 Competition policy is enforced by the Commission, where each of the EU 25 state has a representative.  
∑ Average of ECB, SGP, EU budget and competition policy. 
21 See note 43. 
 
Italy 15 
 
8.33-8.33 
 
8.33-9 
 
4-11 
 
4-4 
 
7.1 
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(1.8) 7.8       ÷ 1.9 
 
France 22 
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Germany 34 
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7.4 ÷ 4.5     (4) 7.8      ÷  4.3 
 
Table VIII 
ECONOMIC SIZE VS POLITICAL SIZE WITHIN THE EU 25 
 
Country Economic 
size 
(GDP in 
2003) 
 
 
in % 
Political size 
(voting rights as of 2005 
i.e. Nice Treaty provisions) 
 
in % 
≈ Magnification  
(or minimization) 
 
Average political size 
economic size 
(or the opposite) 
 Commission Council? Parliament 
 
Pol. 
size∑ 
Laurent & 
Le Cacheux 
vs. 
(unanimity) 
Using 
Banzhaf 
index22 
Malta 0.03 4 1 1 2 X 66  (133) 0.9      X30 
Estonia 0.05 4 1 1 2 X 40   (80) 1.3      X26 
Latvia 0.07 4 1 1 2 X 28   (57) 1.3      X18.5
Lithuania 0.09 4 2 2 2.6 X 29   (44) 2.2      X 24 
Cyprus 0.1 4 1 1 2 X 20   (40) 1.3        X 13
Slovakia 0.2 4 2 2 2.6 X 13   (20) 2.2       X 11 
Slovenia 0.2 4 1 1 2 X 10   (20) 1.3       X6.5 
Luxembourg 0.2 4 1 1 2 X 10   (20) 1.3        X6.5
Hungary 1 4 4 3 3.6 X 3     (4) 3.7       X3.7 
Czech Rep. 1 4 4 3 3.6 X 3     (4) 3.7        X3.7
Ireland 1 4 2 2 2.6 X 2     (4) 2.2       X 2.2 
Portugal 1 4 4 3 3.6 X 3     (4) 3.7      X3.7 
Greece 1 4 4 3 3.6 X 3    (4) 3.7       X 3.7
Finland 2 4 2 2 2.6 X 1.3   (2) 2.2       X1.1 
Poland 2 4 8 7 6.3 X 3   (2) 7.4        X3.7
Denmark 2 4 2 2 2.6 X 1.3  (2) 2.2       X1.1 
Austria 3 4 3 2 3 X 1  (1.3) 3.1      X1.03
Sweden 3 4 3 3 3.3 X 1.1 (1.3) 3.1      X1.03
Belgium 3 4 4 3 3.5 X 1.2 (1.3) 3.7      X1.23
Netherlands 5 4 4 4 4.25 ÷1.25 (1.25) 4        ÷ 1.25   
Spain 7 4 8 7 6.5 ÷1.10 (1.75) 7.4      ÷ 0.9 
Italy 11 4 9 11 8.75 ÷1.3 (2.75) 7.8       ÷1.4 
UK 13 4 9 11 9.25 ÷  1.6 (3.25) 7.8      ÷1.6 
France 17 4 9 11 10.25 ÷  2.1 (4.25) 7.8      ÷2.1 
Germany 26 4 9 14 13.25 ÷  2.8 (6.5) 7.8       ÷3.3 
 
 
                
                                                 
? A qualified majority in the Council is reached under the Nice rules:  if a majority of member 
states (in some cases a two-thirds majority) approve; if a minimum of 232 votes (72.3 percent of 
the total) is cast in favor; if the votes represent at least 62 percent of the total population of the 
Union. 
∑ Average of Commission, Council and Parliament. 
22 Index built on population shares and representing the proportion of times a member state is 
pivotal in decision-making, see Bobay (2004). Romania and Bulgaria are not counted here. 
 
 
 
Table IX 
ECONOMIC SIZE VS POLITICAL SIZE  
IN THE EU 12 AND EU 25 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Economic size 
 
% of GDP 
 
Political size 
 
% of votes 
 
 Council 
 
Banzhaf indexes Laurent & Le Cacheux
    
EU 25 ≈100 ≈100 ≈100 ≈100 
Political 
majority 82 52 46.3 55.7 
79 48 42.6 52.2 
74 44 38.6 48 
67 36 31.2 41.5 
Economic 
majority 56 27 23.4 32.7 
43 18 15.6 23.5 
 
 
 
 
EU 12 ≈100 ≈60 (majority 30) ≈55 (majority 27.5) ≈70 (majority 35) 
Political 
majority 80 35 30.8 27.8 
71 27 23.4 21.7 
Economic 
majority 56 18 15.6 14.6 
34 9 7.8 7.4 
 
 
 
Table X 
THE US 13 IN 1787:  
WELL BALANCED AND READY FOR THE “GREAT COMPROMISE” 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
                        in thousands 
 
State?           Population* 
 
 
Delaware                       59 
Rhode Island                         68.8 
Georgia       82.5 
New Hampshire        141.8 
New Jersey       184.1 
 
                
Connecticut       237.9 
South Carolina       249 
 
 
Maryland       319.7 
New York       340.1 
Massachusetts       378.7 
North Carolina       393.7 
Pennsylvania       434.3 
Virginia       747.6 
 
 
 
? The first 13 American colonies.                                                * As of 1790, the first US Census. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A “Small” state is defined as one with a population inferior to the fourth of the population of the 
biggest state. A “Medium” state is defined as one with a population inferior to half of the population of 
the biggest state. “Large” states are those remaining. 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, extracted from a table available at www.infoplease.com. 
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Chart XVII 
THE OPTIMAL EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION(S) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Buchanan and Tullock (1962).  
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